Many commentators have suggested that the Georgian events have
shown that Medvedev takes his marching orders from Putin. Others have said
that a conflict of this kind has driven the two together, leading Medvedev
to sacrifice some of his reformist plants. And still others have suggested
that the Georgian events have laid the groundwork for a split between the
two men.
No one except perhaps the two men themselves knows which of
these scenarios is accurate. But two articles this week, one an interview
with Russian novelist Boris Strugatsky and a second providing statistics on
the number of times each of the two leaders was referred to in the Russian
media provide some interesting grist for this particular rumor mill.
In an interview featured in "Novaya gazeta v Sankt-Peterburg,"
Strugatsky argued that the war between Russia and Georgia had "killed the
last hope for a 'Medvedev' thaw," something many in Russia and the West had
been hoping for ever since the technocrat replaced the KGB officer (
www.nr2.ru/moskow/194210.html).
According to Strugatsky, "small victorious wars are harmful to
an authoritarian state" because they then act as if they have won the right
to do whatever they please "over their own economy and in general over their
own people," an attitude that does not bode well for Russia's future.
Some have suggested that because of the war, the Russian media
has been creating a new worldview among Russians, the novelist says. But
that is not the case. The media "are supporting a worldview that already
exists. And our worldview - that of the mass population - remains
totalitarian: 'They must fear us.' 'We are the best.'" and so on.
Consequently, no one should have "any illusions" about the
future. "Ahead are the Great Re-Statification and Decisive Militarization
with all the ensuing consequences relative to rights and freedoms.
[Medvedev's] thaw thus ended without having begun. We already have returned
to the beginning of the 1980s. God forbid that this doesn't take us back to
the end of the 1930s."
A second article, in this week's "Argumenty nedeli" by Mikhail
Tul'sky, addresses the issue of the impact of the Georgian conflict on the
status of President Medvedev and particularly on the attention he has
received in the media relative to that of his predecessor Prime Minister
Putin (www.argumenti.ru/publications/7710).
According to Tul'sky, polls taken by the Public Opinion
Foundation showed that the percentage of Russians who said they trust
Medvedev rose from 45 to 54 percent over the two weeks the military conflict
lasted with the share saying they partially trust him and partially not
falling from 28 to 24 percent and those who completely mistrust him from 14
to 11 percent.
Over the same period, these surveys found, trust in Putin rose
from 68 to 72 percent, figures that are much higher than those for Medvedev.
But Tul'sky pointed out, the rates of growth of the popularity of the
current president significantly exceed the rates of growth in the popularity
of his predecessor," a pattern that could change the balance between them.
One reason for Medvedev's relative rise, the "Argumenty nedeli"
journalist says, is that "in August 2008, for the first time, President
Dmitry Medvedev was cited much more often in the Russian mass media than was
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin," a striking development given that until the
Georgian conflict, Medvedev had never approached Putin's numbers.
But in August, according to the Interfax news agency data
system, Medvedev was mentioned in the Russian mass media 6635 times, while
Putin was mentioned only 4662. Some might say Putin arranged this so
Medvedev could take the blame if things had gone wrong, but others are sure
to suggest Medvedev may enjoy the attention and the power that may go with
it.